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Abstract 
The present study investigated the influences of two different forms of reward presentation in 
modulating cognitive control.  In three experiments, participants performed a flanker task for 
which one-third of trials were precued for a chance of obtaining a reward (reward trials).  In 
Experiment 1, a reward was provided if participants made the correct response on reward trials 
but a penalty was given if they made an incorrect response on these trials.  The anticipation of 
this performance-contingent reward increased response speed and reduced the flanker effect but 
had little influence on the sequential modulation of the flanker effect after incompatible trials.  In 
Experiment 2, participants obtained a reward randomly on two-thirds of the precued reward trials 
and were given a penalty on the remaining one-third, regardless of their performance.  The 
anticipation of this non-contingent reward had little influence on the overall response speed or 
flanker effect but reduced the sequential modulation of the flanker effect after incompatible trials.  
Experiment 3 also used performance non-contingent rewards but participants were randomly 
penalized more often than they were rewarded; non-contingent penalty had little influence on the 
sequential modulation of the flanker effect.  None of the three experiments showed a reliable 
influence of the actual acquisition of rewards on task performance. These results indicate 
anticipatory effects of performance contingent and non-contingent rewards on cognitive control 
with little evidence of aftereffects.   
 
Keywords: Cognitive control; performance-contingent reward; random reward; conflict 
adaptation; flanker task. 
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In complex operational environments such as driving a car in a heavy traffic or operating 
an aircraft in air turbulence, momentary distraction of attention can lead to a fatal accident.  In 
such situations, cognitive control needs to be exercised to protect task operations from an 
intrusion of task-irrelevant information.  A recent neurocognitive theory of cognitive control 
postulates two modes of cognitive control, proactive and reactive control (Braver, 2012; Cohen, 
Botvinick, & Carter, 2000).  This dual-process theory proposes that proactive control operates 
according to a specific goal of the task at hand; it prepares for expected changes in the 
environment according to past experiences and the knowledge about relevant events by varying 
the emphases of different goals involved in the task as necessary.  For example, the drivers 
become more cautious about potential hazards on a busy traffic that poses a higher risk of 
collision; such a precautionary state depends on proactive control that strengthens the goal of 
driving safely over other goals, such as reaching a destination faster.  Reactive control enables a 
rapid response to sudden, unexpected changes in the environment, and it adjusts cognitive 
processes momentarily to adapt to the situation.  For instance, drivers may react to a sudden 
appearance of a pedestrian running across a road by interrupting ongoing activities (pushing the 
gas pedal) and switching to an appropriate action (pushing the brake pedal); such rapid changes 
in the course of ongoing actions depend on reactive control.   
Proactive control is characterized by sustained and anticipatory activation within the 
lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), and reactive control is associated with transient activation of the 
PFC and other regions, such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; e.g., Braver, Paxton, Locke, 
& Barch, 2009; Cohen et al., 2000).  The ACC is thought to act as a conflict monitoring system 
that detects conflict in cognitive processes and sends a signal to the PFC to adjust control 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), but it is also involved in a range of other 
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processes, such as sensation, emotion, memory, and attention (see, e.g., Wager et al., 2016).  
Importantly, studies have also noted a role of the ACC in reward-related decision making (e.g., 
Bush et al., 2002; Hadland, Rushworth, Gaffan, & Passingham, 2003; Takenouchi et al., 1999).  
Consistent with this finding, a number of studies have demonstrated links between reward-
related events and these cognitive control operations (Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, & Notebaert, 
2012; Fröber & Dreisbach, 2014, 2016; Hefer & Dreisbach, 2017; Locke & Braver, 2008; van 
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009, 2012), but the results of these studies are not entirely 
consistent.  In particular, some of those studies used the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) 
and yielded contradictory outcomes of rewards on task performance (Braem et al., 2012; van 
Steenbergen et al., 2009; see also Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012).  The present study addressed this 
discrepancy between studies using the flanker task, focusing particularly on the roles of 
anticipation and aftereffect of rewards in modulating cognitive control processes when rewards 
are contingent on task performance and when they are not. 
Influences of Rewards on Cognitive Control 
A number of recent studies have reported effects of reward on cognitive performance.  
For instance, rewards can increase response speed (Capa, Bouquet, Dreher, & Dufour, 2013; 
Kleinsorge & Rinkenauer, 2012; Umemoto & Holroyd, 2015).  Also, monetary incentives have 
shown to enhance perceptual discrimination (Engelmann, Damaraju, Padmala, & Pessoa, 2009), 
short-term memory (Jimura, Locke, & Braver, 2010), inhibitory control in antisaccade tasks 
(Chung et al., 2011; Geier, Terwilliger, Teslovich, Velanova, & Luna, 2010; Padmanabhan, 
Geier, Ordaz, Teslovich, & Luna, 2011), and the efficiency of switching between different tasks 
(Braem et al., 2012; Jiang & Xu, 2014; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002).  Rewards can also 
influence cognitive control.  Previous studies used the AX-continuous performance task (AX-
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CPT), a cue-probe task that distinguishes proactive and reactive control, and provided consistent 
results that monetary incentives increase proactive control (Fröber & Dreisbach, 2014, 2016; 
Hefer & Dreisbach, 2017; Locke & Braver, 2008).  Others used the flanker task and showed that 
rewards affected sequential modulations of the flanker effect, which have been considered to 
reflect reactive control within the dual-process theory (Botvinick et al., 2001), but the directions 
of the influences differed between studies (Braem et al., 2012; van Steenbergen et al., 2009). 
In the flanker task, participants are presented with a set of visual stimuli (e.g., color 
patches) and respond to a target while ignoring adjacent stimuli, or flankers.  Flankers can be 
identical with the target on some trials (compatible trials) or different from the target on other 
trials (incompatible trials).  Responses are typically faster on compatible trials than on 
incompatible trials, yielding the flanker effect.  A robust finding in the flanker task is that the 
flanker effect depends on compatibility on the preceding trial, such that the effect is smaller on 
trials that follow an incompatible trial than on trials that follow a compatible trial (Gratton, Coles, 
& Donchin, 1992; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003; Torres-Quesada, Milliken, Lupiáñez, & Funes, 
2014; also see Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; Stürmer et al., 2002, for similar findings in other 
tasks).   
There are multiple mechanisms that appear responsible for this sequential modulation of 
the flanker effect.  The dual-process theory explains this sequential modulation of the flanker 
effect in terms of reactive control (Botvinick et al., 2001).  According to this explanation, 
conflict experienced on a previous incompatible trial is registered by the ACC as an aversive 
signal, and this signal is sent to the PFC that increases cognitive control in order to resolve the 
conflict.  Due to the increased cognitive control after a conflict trial, the compatibility effect 
decreases on the next trial.  Consequently, the dual-process theorists have termed this 
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phenomenon conflict adaptation effect.  However, other researchers have suggested that the 
sequential modulation is due to priming of stimulus attributes that are presented on preceding 
trials (e.g., Hommel et al., 2004; Mayr et al., 2003).  They have shown that responses are faster 
when all stimulus attributes on the preceding trial repeat (complete repetition) or all switch 
(complete alternation) than when some attributes repeat and others switch (partial alternation).  
This account does not assume resolution of conflict as a source of the sequential modulation. 
In a typical flanker task, the conflict adaptation account and the priming account predict 
the same pattern of the flanker effects, and it appears that both mechanisms contribute to the 
sequential modulation (Egner, 2007).  Furthermore, recent studies have suggested that a number 
of other mechanisms may also be involved (see Duthoo, Abrahamese, Braem, Boehler, & 
Notebaert, 2014).  Thus, the issue of what mechanisms are responsible for the sequential 
modulation has been exceedingly complex, so the present study does not attempt to disentangle 
all of these possible accounts of the sequential modulation. Nevertheless, it is still possible to ask 
an empirical question of whether a certain task parameter influences the sequential modulation, 
apart from the underlying mechanisms that one may assume. Some studies reported that rewards 
reduced this sequential modulation of the flanker effect (van Steenbergen et al., 2009; van 
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2010), but others showed that rewards increased the sequential 
modulation (Braem et al., 2012; Stürmer, Nigbur, Schacht, & Sommer, 2011).  To date, this 
discrepancy has not been addressed sufficiently.  
There are a number of methodological differences between the studies that have shown 
the opposing effects of rewards on the sequential modulation of the flanker effect.  One of the 
most salient differences is the way reward was provided to participants.  When reward increased 
the sequential modulation (Braem et al., 2012), rewards were contingent on task performance; 
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rewards were given when participants responded correctly or within a certain time window 
(Braem et al., 2012; Stürmer et al., 2011).  This performance contingent reward gives 
participants an incentive to perform the task better, which would increase the efficiency of 
proactive control operations in the PFC (Strang & Pollak, 2014).  When reward reduced the 
sequential modulation (van Steenbergen et al., 2009), rewards were provided in a subset of trials 
that were chosen randomly, regardless of task performance.  Such random rewards give no 
incentive to perform the task better, but they could influence the moods of the performer (van 
Steenbergen et al., 2010) or by serving as affective valence cues that influence a transient 
affective state (van Steenbergen, Band, Hommel, Rombouts, & Nieuwenhuis, 2015).  Influences 
of performance contingent and non-contingent rewards have been compared in the AX-CPT as 
well (Fröber & Dreisbach, 2014, 2016; also see Dreisbach & Fisher, 2012), which suggested that 
non-contingent rewards could increase reactive control sometimes but not always; thus, the 
results were not clear-cut in this respect. Therefore, although previous studies have shown 
influences of rewards on cognitive control, they remain unclear as to how rewards do so. More 
data are needed to resolve the mixed findings. 
The Present Study 
The present study investigated the influences of performance contingent and non-
contingent rewards on cognitive control in the flanker task.  We focused on clarifying how 
rewards would affect the behavioral indices of cognitive control, such as response speed, the 
flanker effect, and its sequential modulation in three experiments.  These experiments 
distinguished the contributions of anticipation and aftereffect of reward by examining the 
influences of rewards on two different types of trials.  In the first type of trials, participants were 
precued at the beginning of a trial on which they had a chance to obtain a reward.  Because 
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participants only expected a receipt of the reward but had not received it yet when they 
performed that trial, any effects of a reward would reflect anticipation of a potential reward.  In 
the second type of trials, participants had just received a reward (or lost a reward) on the 
preceding trial, but no precue was provided on that trial, so participants would not have expected 
a reward when they performed the trial.  Any effect of a reward on these trials reflected an 
aftereffect of obtaining a reward.   
In all of the three experiments, participants responded to color targets that were 
accompanied by two flankers.  A reward was presented on one third of the trials, and these 
reward trials were precued by a visual stimulus (a drawing of a treasure box; see Figure 1).  The 
anticipatory effect of a reward was examined in terms of the flanker effect on the precued reward 
trials as compared to the flanker effect on non-reward trials that did not present any precue.  The 
aftereffect of a reward was examined in terms of the flanker effect on non-reward trials that 
followed a reward trial, as compared to the flanker effect on non-reward trials that followed a 
non-reward trial.  All three experiments used the same flanker task but with different forms of 
reward presentation.   
In Experiment 1, rewards were contingent on participants’ performance, such that 
participants gained a point (that represented the amount of a monetary reward given at the end of 
the session) if responses were correct, but they lost a point if responses were incorrect.  In 
Experiment 2, rewards were independent of participants’ performance but were randomly 
presented.  Participants gained a point in two-thirds of the reward trials and lost a point in the 
remaining third.  Experiment 3 was the same as Experiment 2, but the proportions of gains and 
losses were reversed; participants gained a point only in one-third of the reward trials and lost a 
point in the remaining two-third.  The manipulations of the proportions of gains and losses would 
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show the role of anticipating positive or negative outcomes.  The results of the three experiments 
revealed differential contributions of anticipation and aftereffect of performance contingent and 
non-contingent rewards in modulating cognitive control.  Note that the present experiments 
intermixed reward and non-reward trials within the same block of trials, which addressed 
temporal fluctuations of cognitive control by rewards, as opposed to sustained effects that would 
require manipulations of rewards/penalties in separate blocks (e.g., Locke & Braver, 2008). 
Experiment 1 
 The aim of Experiment 1 was to examine the roles of anticipation and aftereffect of 
rewards in modulating the flanker effect and its sequential modulation when rewards depended 
on performance outcomes.  Participants performed the flanker task in which they responded to 
the colors of target stimuli while ignoring the flankers whose colors were either identical with or 
different from the target color.  On one-third of the trials, participants earned points if they made 
correct responses, and lost points if they made incorrect responses.  Monetary rewards were 
given at the end of the session according to the accumulated points.  In a similar task setting 
(Braem et al., 2012), the sequential modulation of the flanker effect by preceding compatibility 
was found to increase on trials that followed a reward, as compared to trials that followed no 
reward.  A similar effect of performance-contingent reward was also obtained in a different but 
similar task setting, namely the Simon task, in which the sequential modulation of the Simon 
effect increased when good performance was rewarded as opposed to when poor performance 
was punished (Stürmer et al., 2011).  However, these studies did not assess differential roles of 
anticipation and aftereffect of rewards.  The present study extended these investigations by 
examining the role of anticipating a reward on the flanker effect by presenting a precue that 
signaled a forthcoming reward trial, as well as that of acquiring a reward on the preceding trial.   
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From the view of the dual-process theory (Braver, 2012; Cohen et al., 2000), 
performance-contingent rewards would serve as incentive cues that increase the efficiency of 
proactive control.  Stronger proactive control would be exercised when a reward trial was 
precued, as compared to when it was not (i.e., non-reward trial).  No study has examined whether 
this anticipatory effect of reward alone is sufficient or the actual acquisition of reward is 
necessary to influence the sequential modulation of the flanker effect.  If the anticipation is 
sufficient, the flanker effect should be affected by compatibility on the preceding trial more on 
reward trials than on non-reward trials.  If the acquisition is necessary, the flanker effect would 
be affected by the preceding compatibility more when the preceding trial was a reward trial than 
when it was a non-reward trial.  As we mentioned earlier, these predictions do not concern any 
specific mechanisms that may be responsible for the sequential modulation.  
Participants 
 Forty eight participants were recruited from the Edge Hill University community (32 
females; mean age = 20.44, SD = 3.69) who received experimental credits toward their 
psychology module or were paid £6 for participation.  They also received additional monetary 
rewards, which ranged from £1 to £3, depending on their task performance.  All participants 
reported having normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, normal color vision, and normal 
hearing.  The experimental protocol was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the 
Psychology Department at Edge Hill University.  Power analyses indicated that the current 
sample size would provide a statistical power of at least .99, assuming a medium effect size1 and 
correlation coefficient of .8 between within-subject measures. 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
                                                          
1 van Steenbergen et al. (2009) had reported a Cohen’s d of .49 (medium effect size) for the effect of reward on the 
sequential modulation.  Although Braem et al. (2012) and Stürmmer et al. (2011) did not report effect sizes, the 
range of their sample was 21-44 participants.  
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 The apparatus consisted of a 23-inch widescreen computer monitor and a personal 
computer.  The experiment was controlled by E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tool, 
Pittsburgh, PA).  Stimuli were filled squares (2.6 cm in sides) colored in green or red, which 
were presented against a light grey background.  The fixation mark was a plus sign (“+”) printed 
in the 60-pt Arial font in black.  The reward cue was a picture of a treasure box (see Figure 1), 
and feedback on a reward trial was either a treasure box filled with a mountain of gold coins 
along with a fanfare sound or an empty treasure box with a buzz sound.  There was no auditory 
stimulus along with a reward cue.  Responses were registered by pressing two keys (f and j) on a 
standard desktop QWERTY keyboard.   
Procedure 
 The experiment was conducted individually under normal fluorescent lighting.  
Participants were seated in front of the computer monitor, wore headphones, and read 
instructions on the screen.  They first performed 16 practice trials that consisted only of 
nonreward trials.  Participants were then informed that some trials would be reward trials on 
which they could gain a point if they responded to stimuli correctly, but could lose a point if they 
made an error.  Participants were also told that they would be paid extra monetary rewards 
according to the total point they earned during the session.  After the instructions, participants 
were given another block of 20 practice trials that consisted of 6 reward trials and 14 nonreward 
trials, followed by four blocks of 152 test trials each (50 reward trials and 102 nonreward trials).  
The first and last trials of each block were always nonreward trials, and the first trial was 
excluded from the analysis.  No repetition of reward trials was allowed; noreward trials could 
repeat no more than three times in row.   
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 The event sequences for reward and nonreward trials are depicted in Figure 1.  Each 
nonreward trial started with the fixation cross at the centre of screen for 500 ms, followed by a 
horizontal array of three filled squares.  The square in the middle was the target to which 
participants responded, and the two adjacent squares were flankers to be ignored.  The flankers 
were always in the same color.  On a compatible trial, the target color was the same as the 
flanker color.  On an incompatible trial, the target color was different from the flanker color.  
Compatible and incompatible trials occurred in an equal probability, and the target color was 
chosen from the two colors randomly on each trial.  Participants had to respond within 1500 ms 
after the target onset.  If the response was correct, a 1000-ms blank screen replaced the stimuli.  
If the response was incorrect or if there was no response within the response window, the screen 
was blanked for 1000 ms and a low pitch tone (400 Hz, 500 ms) was presented through the 
headphones within this period.  There was a 500-ms blank display before the next trial started.  
 A reward trial was essentially the same as nonreward trials, but there was a reward cue 
before the fixation cross was presented.  The reward cue stayed on the screen for 750 ms and was 
followed by the fixation cross.  The target and flankers were presented in the same manner as on 
nonreward trials.  If the response was correct, a fanfare sound was presented for 1000 ms along 
with the message “+1” and a picture of the treasure box filled with gold coins.  If the response 
was an error, a buzz sound was presented for 1000 ms along with the message “–1” and a picture 
of an empty box.  A 500-ms blank display appeared before the next trial. 
 Response time (RT) and accuracy were recorded on each trial.  RT was the interval 
between target onset and a depression of a response key.  Responses were recorded as errors if a 
wrong key was pressed.   
Results 
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 Mean RT for correct responses and percentage of error trials were computed for each trial.  
Trials were discarded if RT was less than 150 ms or there was no response (0.28% of all trials) or 
if trials followed an error response (2.39%).  RT and PE were analysed in two ways, one that 
examined the role of anticipation of reward and the other that examined the role of aftereffect.  
RT is shown in Figure 2, and PE are summarized in Table 1.   
The Role of Reward Anticipation 
 To examine the role of anticipating a reward, RT and PE were computed for nonreward 
trials and reward trials, both followed a nonreward trial.  Nonreward trials that followed a reward 
trial were not included in the present analysis.  RT and PE were then submitted to 2 (Trial Type: 
reward vs. nonreward) x 2 (Previous Compatibility: after compatible vs. after incompatible) x 2 
(Current Compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible) ANOVAs.  All factors were within-subject 
variables. The results are summarized in Table 2 
 For RT (see Figure 2A), as indicated by the significant main effect of Previous 
Compatibility, responses were faster after compatible trials (M = 472 ms) than after incompatible 
trials (M = 481 ms) in general.  Also, the significant main effect of Current Compatibility 
indicated that responses were faster for compatible trials (M = 466 ms) than for incompatible 
trials (M = 487 ms), yielding 21 ms of the flanker effect.  The flanker effect also depended on 
Previous Compatibility; the effect was larger after compatible trials (M = 31 ms) than after 
incompatible trials (M = 11 ms).  Importantly, the significant main effect of Trial Type showed 
that responses were faster when a reward trial was cued (M = 470 ms) than when it was not (M = 
483 ms), and its interaction with Current Compatibility indicated that the flanker effect was 
smaller when a reward trial was cued (M = 15 ms) than when it was not (M = 28 ms).  These 
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outcomes suggested that an anticipation of rewards facilitated response speed and reduced the 
flanker effect.    
For PE, the significant main effect of Current Compatibility indicated the flanker effect 
of .88%.  Although only marginal statistically, the effect tended to be larger after compatible 
trials (M = 1.33%) than after incompatible trials (M = .43%).  No other effects were significant. 
The Role of Reward Aftereffect 
 To examine the aftereffect of reward, the present analysis examined RT and PE for 
nonreward trials that followed a reward trial and those that followed a nonreward trial.  They 
were submitted to 2 (Previous Trial Type: reward vs. nonreward) x 2 (Previous Compatibility: 
after compatible vs. after incompatible) x 2 (Current Compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible) 
ANOVAs.  All factors were within-subject variables.  The results are summarized in Table 2. 
 For RT (see Figure 2B), the significant main effect of Previous Trial Type indicated that 
responses were faster on trials that followed compatible trials (M = 485 ms) than on trials that 
followed incompatible trials (M = 495 ms).  The significant main effect of Current Compatibility 
also indicated that responses were faster for compatible trials (M = 478 ms) than for 
incompatible trials (M = 503 ms), yielding 25 ms of the flanker effect.  Although statistically 
marginal, the flanker effect was somewhat larger after nonreward trials (M = 27 ms) than after 
reward trials (M = 21 ms).   
 For PE, the significant main effects of Previous Compatibility and of Current 
Compatibility showed respectively that responses were more accurate after compatible trials (M 
= 1.84%) than after incompatible trials (M = 2.44%) and that responses were more accurate for 
compatible trials (M = 1.77%) than for incompatible trials (M = 2.50%), yielding .73% of the 
flanker effect.  The interaction between Current Compatibility and Previous Trial Type indicated 
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that the flanker effect was larger after nonreward trials (M = 1.24%) than after reward trials (M 
= .22%).  No other effects were significant. 
Discussion 
The present experiment disentangled the roles of anticipation and aftereffect of 
performance contingent rewards in the flanker task.  Precuing a reward trial facilitated response 
speed and reduced the flanker effect, as compared to when a reward trial was not precued (which 
meant that a nonreward trial followed).  Rewards facilitated RT for incompatible trials more than 
RT for compatible trials (19-ms facilitation for incompatible vs. 6-ms facilitation for compatible).  
It may be noteworthy that Wühr and Kunde (2008) presented a precue indicating forthcoming 
stimulus-response compatibility in the Simon task, by which one would expect stronger 
proactive control, and found a larger effect of precue on compatible trials than on incompatible 
trials, which increased the Simon effect instead of reducing it.  This finding implies that people 
may be able to take advantage of precued S-R compatibility more than precued S-R 
incompatibility, whereas the present finding implies that the anticipation of performance 
contingent rewards reduced distraction from the flankers, which is consistent with the previous 
finding that reward enhanced the goal maintenance (Hefer & Dreisbach, 2017).  The flanker 
effect was also reduced after reward trials (although this was significant in PE and only marginal 
in RT).  These results may reflect a carry-over effect of increased proactive control because of a 
reward precue.   
Nevertheless, there was little evidence that either of these effects interacted with the 
effect of compatibility on the preceding trial.  Although the flanker effect depended on the 
preceding compatibility, neither the anticipation nor aftereffect of reward affected the sequential 
modulation.  The influence of performance contingent reward on the sequential modulation of 
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the flanker effect was reported in a previous study (Braem et al., 2012), but the present results 
did not replicate the finding.  However, the result are consistent with the dual-process theory that 
suggests that performance-contingent reward affects proactive control, not reactive control, 
which is also supported at least in part by recent studies (Fröber & Dreisbach, 2016; Hefer & 
Dreisbach, 2017), although it is not possible to point out an exact mechanism of the sequential 
modulation in the present experiment.   
Overall, the results of the present experiment suggested that anticipating performance 
contingent rewards increased proactive control, reducing the flanker effect on reward trials and 
trials that followed a reward trial.  A caution has to be exercised, however, because the timing of 
a reward trial was slightly different from that of a nonreward trial, having an additional 750-ms 
precue display preceding the target.  Thus, it is possible that the flanker effect was smaller on 
reward trails only because there was an extra time to prepare responding to the target by 
increasing the readiness on these trials.  Also, it may be a mere presentation of a salient precue, 
rather than the reward itself, that led to the difference in the flanker effect between reward and 
nonreward trials.  If any of these factors accounted for the present outcomes, the same results 
should be replicated even when rewards are not contingent on performance, which was examined 
in Experiment 2.  
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, rewards were provided randomly in one third of the trials. The 
procedure was identical with that of Experiment 1 in other respects.  On these “reward” trials, 
participants could gain or lose a point that represented monetary rewards paid at the end of the 
session (note that, in the subsequent discussions, these trials will be called “reward trials” as 
opposed to non-reward trials on which no gain or loss occurred).  Reward trials were precued in 
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the same manner as in Experiment 1, and participants gained a point in two-third of the reward 
trials and lost a point in one-third of the reward trials.  Although reward trials were precued, 
reward outcomes (gain or loss) were determined randomly without a precue, so they were 
unpredictable.  As reward outcomes were independent of performance outcomes, there was no 
incentive to exert stronger proactive control even when a reward trial was precued.  If the 
outcomes of Experiment 1 were merely due to the timing differences between reward and 
nonreward trials, the present experiment should replicate the same results; that is, the flanker 
effect should be smaller on reward trials than non-reward trials, as well as on trials that followed 
a reward trial than on those that followed a nonreward trial.   
Alternatively, previous studies would suggest that random rewards act as positive valence 
cues (Fröber & Dreisbach, 2014), which then should counteract the conflict signal from the ACC 
(van Steenbergen et al., 2009).  If this is the case, random rewards would reduce the influence of 
preceding compatibility on the flanker effect on trials that follow a reward gain, as compared to 
trials that follow a loss or no reward.  Furthermore, to our knowledge, there has not been any 
study that examined the role of anticipating a random reward on proactive control and reactive 
control.  While previous studies showed that random rewards would affect reactive control (e.g., 
van Steenbergen et al., 2009), they did not examine whether the prospect of a random reward is 
sufficient to affect reactive control.  As gains were given in two-third of reward trials and were 
predominant, participants could anticipate a positive reward when a reward trial was precued in 
the present experiment.  Participants may associate the precue with a positive outcome, which 
then serves as an anticipatory valence cue.  This should counteract the conflict signal from the 
preceding incompatible trial and reduce the sequential modulation of the flanker effect on reward 
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trials.  Such an outcome would suggest an anticipatory effect of noncontingent reward on 
reactive control.   
Method 
Participants 
 A new group of 48 participants were recruited from the same subject pool as in 
Experiment 1 (35 females; mean age = 20.44, SD = 3.27), with the same recruitment criteria. 
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
 The apparatus and stimuli were the same as those in Experiment 1, and the procedure 
followed that of Experiment 1.  A major modification was that gain and loss of rewards were 
provided randomly, irrespective of the response accuracy.  After the first practice block that 
consisted of nonreward trials only, participants were informed that they would be presented with 
a treasure box on some of the trials, indicating a chance to gain a reward.  They were also told 
that the reward would be given randomly and that it was nothing to do with their performance.  
Two thirds of reward trials resulted in a gain, and one third resulted in a loss.  Participants were 
not informed of the proportions of gain and loss trials.  The procedure followed Experiment 1 in 
other respects. 
Results 
 Trials were filtered in the same manner as Experiment 1(1.05% of all trials for no 
response or RT < 150 ms; 7.93% for trials after error). RT and PE were computed and analyzed 
to examine the roles of anticipation and aftereffect of random rewards separately.  RT is shown 
in Figure 3, and PE is summarized in Table 1.   
The Role of Reward Anticipation 
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 To examine the role of anticipating a random reward, RT and PE were submitted to 2 
(Trial Type: reward vs. nonreward) x 2 (Previous Compatibility: after compatible vs. after 
incompatible) x 2 (Current Compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible) ANOVAs.  Note that the 
analysis did not distinguish between gain and loss trials because the reward precue only indicated 
that there was a potential of a reward, but not whether it was a gain or loss.  As in Experiment 1, 
nonreward trials that followed a reward trial were not included in the present analysis. The 
results of ANOVAs are summarized in Table 3. 
 For RT (see Figure 3A), the significant main effect of Current Compatibility indicated 
that responses were faster for compatible trials (M = 453 ms) than for incompatible trials (M = 
475 ms), yielding a 22-ms flanker effect.  This effect depended on Previous Compatibility, such 
that the flanker effect was 42 ms after compatible trials but was reduced to 1 ms after 
incompatible trials.  Importantly, these sequential modulations depended on Trial Type.  When a 
reward trial was precued, there was a smaller sequential modulation of the flanker effect (M = 28 
ms) than when it was a nonreward trial (M = 53 ms).  This outcome implies that a prospect of a 
random reward was sufficient to reduce the sequential modulation of the flanker effect.  
Although only marginal, the main effect of Trial Type showed a tendency that responses are 
faster when a reward trial was precued (M = 461 ms) than when a nonreward trial was precued 
(M = 468 ms).   
 For PE, the significant main effect of Current Compatibility showed that responses were 
more accurate for compatible trials (M = 6.84%) than for incompatible trials (M = 7.75%), 
yielding a 0.91% flanker effect.  This effect interacted with Previous Compatibility, showing that 
the flanker effect was 3.89% after compatible trials, but it was reversed to –2.07% after 
incompatible trials.  The main effect of Trial Type indicated that responses were more accurate 
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when a nonreward trial was precued (M = 5.39%) than when a reward trial was precued (M = 
9.20%), and the significant 3-way interaction among Trial Type, Previous Compatibility, and 
Current Compatibility suggested that the sequential modulation of the flanker effect was smaller 
when a reward trial was precued (M = 2.78%) than when it was not (M = 9.13%). 
The Role of Reward Aftereffect 
 To examine the role of reward aftereffect, RT and PE for nonreward trials were submitted 
to 3 (Previous Trial Type: gain vs. loss vs. nonreward) x 2 (Previous Compatibility: after 
compatible vs. after incompatible) x 2 (Current Compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible) 
ANOVAs.  Table 3 summarizes the results. 
 For RT (see Figure 3B), the main effect of Current Compatibility showed that responses 
were faster for compatible trials (M = 452 ms) than for incompatible trials (M = 474 ms), 
yielding a 22-ms flanker effect.  Its interaction with Previous Compatibility indicated that the 
flanker effect was larger after compatible trials (M = 41 ms) than after incompatible trials (M = 2 
ms).  This reduction of the flanker effect after incompatible trials was 24 ms after a gain, 39 ms 
after a loss, and 53 ms after a nonreward trial, although the 3-way interaction among Trial Type, 
Current Compatibility, and Previous Compatibility, was only marginal.   
 For PE, the main effect of Current Compatibility showed that responses were more 
accurate for compatible trials (M = 4.75%) than for incompatible trials (M = 5.97%), yielding 
1.22% of the flanker effect.  This effect interacted with Previous Compatibility; the flanker effect 
was 6.16% after compatible trials, and it reversed to –3.71% after incompatible trials. No other 
effects were significant.  
Discussion 
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The present experiment used the same procedure as in Experiment 1, except for the way 
rewards were provided, but the results differed markedly from those of Experiment 1.  There was 
little influence of rewards on the overall response speed or flanker effect.  This outcome is 
important methodologically, because it implies that the results of Experiment 1 were not due to 
the additional precue period that lengthened the intertrial interval of reward trials as compared to 
that of nonreward trials (see the General Discussion for further considerations of this issue).  
Hence, the present results corroborate the conclusion that the anticipation of performance 
contingent rewards enhanced the response speed and reduced the flanker effect on reward trials 
in Experiment 1, but the anticipation of non-contingent rewards did not in Experiment 2.  We 
also note that the overall error rate was lower in Experiment 1 (2.03%) than in the present 
experiment (6.33%).  This may reflect the incentive for better performance in the former 
experiment, which was not present with random rewards in the latter. 
In the meantime, the present results also showed that the reductions of the flanker effect 
after incompatible trials were smaller on reward trials than on nonreward trials.  Such reductions 
were not observed in Experiment 1.  Given that this occurred before the rewards were actually 
presented to participants, the outcomes represent an anticipatory effect of non-contingent 
rewards. Within the dual-process theory (Braver, 2012), this result can be interpreted that the 
prospect of a random reward served as a positive valence cue that counteracted the conflict 
signal from the preceding incompatible trial.  The theory suggests that the ACC detects a conflict 
on incompatible trials and signals the PFC to increase cognitive control.  Positive rewards can 
counteract this conflict signal, which then reduces reactive control, resulting in smaller 
reductions of the flanker effect when rewards are precued.  Although only marginally significant, 
there was also some reductions of the sequential modulation after gain trials, as compared to 
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those obtained after loss or non-reward trials.  These outcomes are consistent with the previous 
study using non-contingent rewards in the flanker task (van Steenbergen et al., 2009).  
Interestingly, a loss trial did not lead to an increase of the sequential modulation as compared to 
nonreward trials. This may be because the conflict signal already had a maximum strength, so 
the addition of a negative event could not amplify the signal further.  
The current finding of the anticipatory effect of non-contingent rewards on the sequential 
modulation of the flanker effect is new, and it supports the distinct roles of performance 
contingent rewards in Experiment 1 and non-contingent rewards in the present experiment.  We 
further followed up this anticipatory effect of non-contingent rewards in the next experiment.  It 
was presumed that the reduction of the sequential modulation resulted from the predominant 
proportion of gain trials, which led participants to anticipate a positive reward outcome when a 
precue is provided.  Experiment 3 reversed the proportions of gain and loss trials, so that 
participants should now anticipate negative outcomes more than positive ones when a reward 
trial is precued.  We tested whether the anticipation of negative outcomes would have the same 
impact on cognitive control as that of anticipating positive outcomes.   
Experiment 3 
The present experiment examined whether the anticipatory effect of non-contingent 
rewards depended on the proportion of gains and losses.  In Experiment 3, two-thirds of reward 
trials resulted in a loss, and the remaining one-third resulted in a gain; thus, participants would 
anticipate more negative outcomes when reward trials were precued.  If the results of Experiment 
2 were due to anticipation of any non-contingent event, regardless of whether it is positive or 
negative, then the sequential modulation of the flanker effect should also be reduced when 
reward trials were precued in the present experiment, as compared to when they were not.  From 
 Reward Effect  23 
 
the view of the dual-process theory, the anticipation of negative events could amplify the 
aversive signal from conflict and increase reactive control.  This could result in a greater 
modulation of the flanker effect after an incompatible trial.  Nevertheless, Experiment 2 has also 
shown that loss trials did not lead to a greater modulation of the flanker effect, as compared to 
nonreward trials, suggesting that the additional aversive event did not facilitate reactive control.  
Therefore, the anticipation of non-contingent rewards may not influence the sequential 
modulation of the flanker effect when negative outcomes are predominant.  
Method 
Participants 
 Forty eight participants were newly recruited from the same subject pool as in 
Experiments 1 and 2 (29 females; mean age = 20.98, SD = 4.53), with the same recruitment 
criteria. 
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
 Experiment 3 was identical with Experiment 2, except that the proportions of gain and 
loss trials were modified.  Two thirds of all reward trials resulted in a loss, and one third resulted 
in a gain.  Participants were instructed on the task in the same manner as in Experiment 2, and 
they were not informed of the proportions of losses and gains.  Although all sessions necessarily 
ended with a negative overall score as there were more loss trials, the score was inverted to a 
positive score after the session, so that all participants received additional compensations 
equivalent to those for participants in Experiment 2.  Participants were not informed of this 
inversion until they completed the session. 
Results 
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 Trials were filtered in the same manner as in the preceding experiments (.68% of all trials 
for no response or RT < 150 ms; 6.72% for trials after error).  RT and PE were analysed in the 
same manner as in Experiment 2.  RT is shown in Figure 4, and PE is summarized in Table 1.   
The Role of Reward Anticipation 
RT and PE were submitted to 2 (Trial Type: reward vs. nonreward) x 2 (Previous 
Compatibility: after compatible vs. after incompatible) x 2 (Current Compatibility: compatible vs. 
incompatible) ANOVAs, and the results are summarized in Table 4. 
For RT (see Figure 4A), the main effect of Current Compatibility indicated that responses 
were faster for compatible trials (M = 452 ms) than for incompatible trials (M = 478 ms), 
yielding a 25-ms flanker effect.  The significant main effect of Previous Compatibility also 
indicated that responses were also faster after compatible trials (M = 463 ms) than after 
incompatible trials (M = 467 ms).  These two factors interacted, showing that the flanker effect 
was 53 ms after compatible trials, and it was reduced to –1 ms after incompatible trials. The 
significant main effect of Trial Type revealed that responses were faster when a reward trial was 
precued (M = 461 ms) than when it was not (M = 469 ms).  The flanker effect was 22 ms when a 
reward trial was precued, and it was 30 ms when there was no precue, which was reflected in a 
marginally significant interaction between Trial Type and Current Compatibility.  No other 
effects were significant. 
For PE, the significant main effect of Current Compatibility indicated that responses were 
more accurate for compatible trials (M = 5.06%) than for incompatible trials (M = 6.68%), 
yielding a 1.62% flanker effect.  This effect interacted with Previous Compatibility; the flanker 
effect was larger after compatible trials (M = 5.39%) than after incompatible trials (M = –2.14%).   
The main effect of Trial Type indicated that responses were also more accurate when a 
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nonreward trial was precued (M = 5.09%) than when a reward trial was precued (M = 6.66%).  
No other effects reached significance. 
The Role of Reward Aftereffect 
RT and PE for nonreward trials were submitted to 3 (Previous Trial Type: gain vs. loss vs. 
nonreward) x 2 (Previous Compatibility: after compatible vs. after incompatible) x 2 (Current 
Compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible) ANOVAs, and Table 4 summarizes the results.   
For RT (see Figure 4B), the main effect of Current Compatibility indicated that responses 
were faster for compatible trials (M = 469 ms) than for incompatible trials (M = 497 ms), 
yielding a 28-ms flanker effect, and its interaction with Previous Compatibility indicated that the 
flanker effect was larger after compatible trials (M = 58 ms) than after incompatible trials (M = –
3 ms).  The main effect of Previous Trial Type indicated that responses were fastest when the 
previous trial was a nonreward trial (M = 469 ms), intermediate when it was a gain (M = 487 ms), 
and slowest when it was a loss (M = 493 ms).  No other effects were significant. 
For PE, the main effect of Current Compatibility indicated that responses were more 
accurate for compatible trials (M = 4.41%) than for incompatible trials (M = 5.75%), yielding a 
1.34% flanker effect, and its interaction with Previous Compatibility showed that the flanker 
effect was larger after compatible trials (M = 6.23%) than after incompatible trials (M = –3.55%).  
No other effects were significant. The overall error rate was (M = 5.47%), similar to Experiment 
2 but still lower than Experiment 1; as suggested earlier, the lower error rate in Experiment 1 
likely reflected the performance-contingent incentives. 
Discussion 
 The present experiment examined whether the anticipatory effect of non-contingent 
rewards depended on the proportions of reward outcomes.  In contrast to the results of 
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Experiment 2, which showed that the anticipation of non-contingent rewards reduced the 
sequential modulation of the flanker effect when gains were predominant, the present results 
revealed little influence on the sequential modulation when loss trials were predominant.  These 
results support the conclusion that the anticipation of a positive outcome drives the influence of 
non-contingent rewards, not just a possibility of any non-contingent event.  Again, these results 
also indicated that any anticipatory effects observed in the preceding experiments were not 
explained by the timing of the stimulus events alone (i.e., the additional 750 ms for the reward 
precue on reward trials), because the only difference between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 
was the proportion of gains and losses.  Therefore, the contents of the events that followed the 
reward precues did matter. 
Two outcomes of the experiment were not predicted a priori, so they require some 
speculations.  The first unexpected outcome was that the anticipation of a reward trial facilitated 
response speed and reduced the flanker effect.  These observations were similar to those obtained 
with performance-contingent rewards in Experiment 1, and they indicated that stronger proactive 
control was exerted when a reward trial was precued.  An anecdotal explanation of these findings 
would be that some participants desperately tried to figure out why they were being punished and 
attempted to perform the task better in order to avoid losses, despite the fact that they had been 
informed that reward was determined randomly.  These participants might have exercised 
stronger proactive control on a reward trial.  The present results also suggested that responses 
were particularly slowed after a loss trial, which was not observed when gain trials were 
predominant in Experiment 2.  Such slowing might have occurred if participants tried to figure 
out an explanation for the loss after the trial.  Our speculation of guessing about random events 
may be akin to recent findings that cognitive control increased when participants guessed 
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upcoming tasks that were generated randomly but not when they ‘chose’ upcoming tasks that 
might be accepted or denied (Kleinsorge & Scheil, 2016, 2018). 
The second unexpected outcome was that there was little influence on the sequential 
modulation of the flanker effect after a gain trial.  If a gain served as a momentary positive 
valence cue that counteracted the conflict signal, the sequential modulation should have been 
reduced after a gain (van Steenbergen et al., 2015), which was not observed in the present 
experiment.  A possibility is that negative moods had developed while participants experienced 
more losses in the present experiment, and these negative moods might have overridden and 
suppressed the influence of gains; that is, participants were no longer pleased with momentary 
gains as they were always losing overall.  In a previous study, the sequential modulation has 
been shown to depend not only on reward-related factors but also on the moods of participants 
(van Steenbergen et al., 2010).  With the predominance of losses in the present experiment, many 
participants expressed frustration during debriefing at the end of the session.  Thus, participants 
were in negative moods while performing the task, so a momentary positive valence cue might 
not have been as effective as when participants were in positive or neutral moods.  This would 
explain the lack of influence of positive reward on the sequential modulation of the flanker effect. 
 Despite these unexpected (but reasonable in retrospect) outcomes, the present experiment 
supported the claim that the anticipatory effect of non-contingent reward on the sequential 
modulation of the flanker effect depended on the predominance of the outcomes.  Therefore, the 
findings in Experiment 2 is not due to extraneous factors (e.g., the timing of the stimulus 
presentations) other than the reward anticipation and aftereffect.  The results are consistent with 
the claim that there are differential influences of performance contingent and non-contingent 
rewards on proactive and reactive control. 
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General Discussion 
 The last decade saw a rise of the neurocognitive theory of cognitive control, which 
distinguishes proactive and reactive control as the sources of behavior regulation (e.g., Botvinick, 
2007; Braver, 2012).  This dual-process theory is well grounded in behavioral and cognitive 
neuroscience evidence, and there is a growing interest as to how these cognitive operations 
interplay with motivational and emotional factors (e.g., Botvinick & Braver, 2010; Braem et al, 
2012; Fröber & Dreisbach, 2016; Hadland et al., 2003; Stürmer et al., 2011; van Steenbergen et 
al., 2010).  The present study aimed at distinguishing the roles of anticipation and aftereffect of 
two forms of reward presentation in proactive and reactive control.  In the three experiments, the 
contingency of reward on task performance was manipulated.  In Experiment 1, reward was 
contingent on task performance, where participants gained a reward when they performed the 
task correctly, but they lost it when they made an error.  Precuing a reward trial facilitated the 
overall response speed and decreased the flanker effect, which suggests an increase in proactive 
control, consistent with previous findings that incentives enhance attentional control and reduce 
conflict (Engelmann et al., 2009; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011).  On the other hand, Experiment 1 
offered little evidence that performance-contingent rewards influenced the sequential modulation 
of the flanker effect.  This outcome contradicts a previous study that reported an increased 
sequential modulation after a performance-contingent reward was provided (Braem et al, 2012), 
but it is consistent with recent studies using the AX-CPT that suggested that performance-
contingent rewards increased proactive control but not reactive control (Fröber & Dreisbach, 
2014; Hefer & Dreisbach, 2017).   
With non-contingent rewards, the anticipation of a positive reward was shown to reduce 
the sequential modulation of the flanker effect in Experiment 2, but the anticipation of a negative 
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reward had little impact on the sequential modulation in Experiment 3.  Previous studies have 
shown that there were smaller sequential modulations of the flanker effect after a non-contingent 
reward was acquired (van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012), which is consistent with the results of 
Experiment 2.  However, these studies have not separated the anticipatory effect of non-
contingent rewards from their aftereffects.  Because the three experiments of the present study 
used the same procedure except for the contingency of rewards, the discrepancies of the results 
point to the influence of the contingency, not other peripheral factors such as timing of trial 
events that were slightly different between reward and nonreward trials.  Instead, the present 
findings provide a novel conclusion that, based on the dual-process theory, the prospect of a non-
contingent reward is sufficient to modulate proactive and reactive control.  
According to the dual-process theory, reactive control depends on aversive conflict 
signals from the ACC to the PFC, and a positive valence cue can cancel out the aversive signals, 
resulting in a reduction of the sequential modulation of the flanker effect.  Within this framework, 
the present results imply that anticipation of a positive reward serves as a positive valence cue 
and is sufficient to cancel the aversive signal.  A previous study also has shown that the 
sequential modulation is reduced under positive moods (van Steenbergen et al., 2010), which 
suggests a sustained effect of positive affect.  As the present study varied positive and negative 
rewards across trials in a random fashion and the effects of rewards were examined by 
comparing trials within the same block, the findings reflected transient effects of non-contingent 
rewards on reactive control.  Thus, together with van Steenbergen et al.’s finding, the present 
study add that there are both sustained and transient effects of non-contingent rewards on 
reactive control, which can be contrasted to the previous findings that there are both sustained 
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and transient effects of performance-contingent rewards on proactive control (e.g., Chiew & 
Braver, 2013; Engelmann et al., 2009; Locke & Braver, 2008). 
Interestingly, there was little influence of anticipating negative rewards on reactive 
control.  When losses were predominant, the transient effect of positive rewards was also absent.  
A possible reason for this outcome is that the anticipation of negative rewards led to negative 
moods, which thus produced a sustained effect of negative rewards and suppressed the transient 
effect of positive rewards.  It is equally possible that the influence of reward aftereffect is 
contingent on the anticipation of rewards, such that positive rewards can affect proactive or 
reactive control only when positive rewards have been anticipated prior to the reward outcome 
(cf. Notebaert & Braem, 2015).  It may be the consistency between expected and actual 
outcomes, not mere positive valence cue, that counteracted the conflict signal on incompatible 
trials and decreased reactive control on the following trial.  This possibility needs to be 
scrutinized in future investigations.  
A possible limitation of the present study was mentioned in Experiment 1 and addressed 
in Experiments 2 and 3, which was that any differences between reward and nonreward trials in 
the current procedure could reflect the timing differences between the two types of trial. 
Throughout the three experiments, a reward trial was preceded by a reward cue that appeared for 
750 ms, which did not appear on a nonreward trial. In a study that used a Stroop-like task 
involving a categorization of facial stimuli into male or female that were accompanied by the 
word MALE or FEMALE, the sequential modulation of the Stroop-like effect decreased as the 
intertrial interval (ITI) increased (Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010).  If this time-course of the 
sequential modulation is responsible solely for the present findings, one would have to speculate 
that the lack of the influence of performance contingent reward in Experiment 1 reflected a 
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decay of the sequential modulation, whereas the presence of the influence of performance non-
contingent reward in Experiment 2 reflected a facilitation.  Furthermore, the lack of the influence 
of performance non-contingent reward in Experiment 3 should also reflect a decay, that is, in the 
opposite direction to that obtained in Experiment 2. Consequently, the time-course of the 
sequential modulation should have depended on the contingency of reward on performance as 
well as the predominance of gains or losses of performance non-contingent reward.  This 
alternative interpretation is highly speculative and opportunistic, and we also note that it only 
differs from our conclusion as to whether reward affects reactive control indirectly via intertrial 
interval or directly via anticipation of reward.  Moreover, the alternative account does not have 
much to say about why proactive control also reduced when performance-contingent reward was 
precued (Egner et al. did not report any effect of ITI on overall RT or Stroop-like effect), which 
leaves us flat as to how it explains the present results.  Nevertheless, our conclusion that the 
performance contingency and the predominance of performance non-contingent reward gains 
play important roles in cognitive control still remains intact even if the ITI effect depends on the 
type of reward and the predominance of gain/loss.  Considering the fact that there are several 
possible mechanisms that could give rise to the sequential modulation (Botvinick et al, 2010; 
Duthoo et al., 2014; Hommel et al., 2004), one cannot conclude based on the present results how 
the two forms of reward presentation influence reactive control, but it seems safe to conclude 
that performance contingent rewards affect proactive control, whereas non-contingent rewards 
affect reactive control directly or indirectly.   
The conclusion is generally consistent with previous findings using the AX-CPT (Fröber 
& Dreisbach, 2014; Hefer & Dreisbach, 2017).  The results further suggest that the anticipation 
of rewards plays an important role in both forms of reward presentation, although they are 
 Reward Effect  32 
 
expressed differently.  It would be interesting to examine in future studies as to whether 
anticipation is a prerequisite to observe modulations of proactive and reactive control in the two 
forms of reward presentation.  Researchers have suggested that rewards have both motivational 
and affective components (Berridge & Robinson, 2003), and these components may have 
different influences on cognitive control (Chiew & Braver, 2011).  Another study by Braem et al. 
(2013) found in a task-switching situation that performance contingent presentation of positive 
valenced pictures influenced task-switching cost differently from performance non-contingent 
presentation of positive valenced pictures, consistent with the present findings.  It has further 
been suggested that the affective component of reward depends on the actual delivery of a 
reward (Notebaert & Braem, 2015), but the present study indicates that anticipation of a reward 
is sufficient for the affective component to modulate reactive control without actual delivery. It 
is to be seen whether anticipation is also sufficient for purely affective cues, such as pleasant vs. 
unpleasant pictures, to influence cognitive control (e.g., Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Kuhl & 
Kazén, 1999; Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007; Van der 
Stigchel, Imants, & Ridderinkhof, 2011).  Provided that the influences of affective stimuli or 
moods on cognitive processes still remain unclear in other domains as well (e.g., Bruyneel et al., 
2013), such investigations would provide better understanding of the important interplay 
between cognitive control and affective and motivational processes.   
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Table 1.  Percentages of Error Trials in Experiments 1-3 (the values in the parentheses represent 
one standard error of the means). 
      Compatible Incompatible 
   
Experiment 1 
Nonreward Precue After compatible 
 
1.08 (.28) 2.79 (.47) 
 
After incompatible 
 
2.06 (.39) 2.83 (.53) 
Reward Precue After compatible 
 
1.41 (.24) 2.37 (.40) 
 
After incompatible 
 
1.73 (.38) 1.82 (.35) 
After nonreward After compatible 
 
1.08 (.28) 2.79 (.47) 
 
After incompatible 
 
2.06 (.39) 2.83 (.53) 
After reward After compatible 
 
1.66 (.31) 1.83 (.32) 
  After incompatible   2.30 (.39) 2.56 (.45) 
   
Experiment 2 
Nonreward Precue After compatible 
 
2.44 (.39) 7.67 (1.00) 
 
After incompatible 
 
7.68 (1.00) 3.78 (.51) 
Reward Precue After compatible 
 
7.85 (2.10) 10.39 (1.52) 
 
After incompatible 
 
9.40 (1.48) 9.17 (2.06) 
After nonreward After compatible 
 
2.62 (.64) 7.54 (1.06) 
  After incompatible   6.90 (.92) 3.13 (.55) 
After gain After compatible 
 
1.36 (.49) 9.67 (1.89) 
 
After incompatible 
 
7.51 (1.09) 4.04 (1.32) 
After loss After compatible 
 
2.44 (.39) 7.67 (1.00) 
 
After incompatible 
 
7.68 (1.00) 3.78 (.51) 
   
Experiment 3 
Nonreward After compatible 
 
2.20 (.53) 7.97 (.85) 
 
After incompatible 
 
6.48 (.83) 3.70 (.62) 
Reward After compatible 
 
4.35 (.82) 9.35 (1.03) 
 
After incompatible 
 
7.22 (1.03) 5.71 (1.13) 
After nonreward After compatible 
 
2.20 (.53) 7.97 (.85) 
  After incompatible   6.48 (.83) 3.70 (.62) 
After gain After compatible  2.39 (.63) 8.50 (1.31) 
 After incompatible  6.32 (1.00) 2.57 (.62) 
After loss After compatible  1.33 (.42) 8.14 (1.12) 
 After incompatible  7.76 (.94) 3.63 (.61) 
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Table 2. The results of ANOVAs on response times (RT) and percentage errors (PE) in 
Experiment 1. 
Factors   df MSE F p ηp2 
    Reward Anticipation: RT 
Trial Type (TT) 
 
1,47 2003.94 7.71 .008 .141 
Previous Compatibility (PC) 
 
1,47 502.29 14.65 < .001 .238 
Current Compatibility (CC) 
 
1,47 544.67 79.35 < .001 .628 
TT x PC 
 
1,47 202.42 1.30 .261 .027 
TT x CC 
 
1,47 349.18 11.86 .001 .201 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 386.28 25.67 < .001 .353 
TT x PC x CC   1,47 480.14 < 1 .987 < .001 
  
Reward Anticipation: PE 
TT 
 
1,47 6.32 1.92 .173 .039 
PC 
 
1,47 4.83 < 1 .386 .016 
CC 
 
1,47 6.05 12.32 .001 .208 
TT x PC 
 
1,47 3.89 2.41 .127 .049 
TT x CC 
 
1,47 5.66 2.20 .145 .045 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 4.91 3.95 .053 .078 
TT x PC x CC   1,47 4.77 < 1 .947 < .001 
    Reward Aftereffect: RT 
Previous Trial Type (PTT) 
 
1,47 981.84 21.11 < .001 .310 
PC 
 
1,47 395.80 24.49 < .001 .343 
CC 
 
1,47 690.89 83.87 < .001 .641 
PTT x PC 
 
1,47 320.57 < 1 .844 .001 
PTT x CC 
 
1,47 273.58 3.63 .063 .072 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 393.82 21.35 < .001 .312 
PTT x PC x CC   1,47 416.09 < 1 .688 .003 
  
Reward Aftereffect: PE 
PTT 
 
1,47 5.08 < 1 .657 .004 
PC 
 
1,47 6.27 5.46 .024 .104 
CC 
 
1,47 7.23 7.10 .011 .131 
PTT x PC 
 
1,47 4.50 < 1 .685 .004 
PTT x CC 
 
1,47 4.37 5.71 .021 .108 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 5.53 < 1 .386 .016 
PTT x PC x CC   1,47 5.34 1.17 .286 .024 
Note: Bold indicates statistically significant effects at alpha = .05 
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Table 3. The results of ANOVAs on response times (RT) and percentage errors (PE) in 
Experiment 2. 
Factors   df MSE F p ηp2 
    Reward Anticipation: RT 
Trial Type (TT) 
 
1,47 1355.91 3.70 .061 .073 
Previous Compatibility (PC) 
 
1,47 596.27 1.53 .223 .031 
Current Compatibility (CC) 
 
1,47 1381.87 32.86 < .001 .411 
TT x PC 
 
1,47 546.16 3.15 .083 .063 
TT x CC 
 
1,47 676.11 < 1 .632 .005 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 1667.69 24.09 < .001 .339 
TT x PC x CC   1,47 637.34 5.94 .019 .112 
  
Reward Anticipation: PE 
TT 
 
1,47 249.62 5.59 .022 .106 
PC 
 
1,47 9.23 1.85 .180 .038 
CC 
 
1,47 15.48 5.15 .028 .099 
TT x PC 
 
1,47 11.61 < 1 .463 .012 
TT x CC 
 
1,47 11.58 < 1 .483 .011 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 54.17 15.70 < .001 .250 
TT x PC x CC   1,47 28.05 8.64 .005 .155 
    Reward Aftereffect: RT 
Previous Trial Type (PTT) 
 
2,94 1517.33 2.44 .093 .049 
PC 
 
1,47 1186.93 3.45 .070 .068 
CC 
 
1,47 2318.31 29.71 < .001 .387 
PTT x PC 
 
2,94 1026.30 1.92 .153 .039 
PTT x CC 
 
2,94 941.39 < 1 .803 .005 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 3413.34 15.90 < .001 .253 
PTT x PC x CC   2,94 905.91 2.83 .064 .057 
  
Reward Aftereffect: PE 
PTT 
 
2,94 35.43 < 1 .616 .010 
PC 
 
1,47 23.34 < 1 .471 .011 
CC 
 
1,47 27.04 7.95 .007 .145 
PTT x PC 
 
2,94 25.06 < 1 .768 .006 
PTT x CC 
 
2,94 31.11 1.66 .195 .034 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 74.79 46.88 < .001 .499 
PTT x PC x CC   2,94 23.72 1.43 .246 .029 
Note: Bold indicates statistically significant effects at alpha = .05 
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Table 4. The results of ANOVAs on response times (RT) and percentage errors (PE) in 
Experiment 3. 
Factors   df MSE F p ηp2 
    Reward Anticipation: RT 
Trial Type (TT) 
 
1,47 1268.20 4.76 .034 .092 
Previous Compatibility (PC) 
 
1,47 352.12 5.31 .026 .102 
Current Compatibility (CC) 
 
1,47 812.40 80.17 < .001 .630 
TT x PC 
 
1,47 517.08 < 1 .626 .005 
TT x CC 
 
1,47 448.22 3.78 .058 .074 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 863.59 83.53 < .001 .640 
TT x PC x CC   1,47 464.74 < 1 .397 .015 
  
Reward Anticipation: PE 
TT 
 
1,47 32.54 7.29 .010 .134 
PC 
 
1,47 17.70 < 1 .652 .004 
CC 
 
1,47 18.86 13.41 .001 .222 
TT x PC 
 
1,47 17.44 < 1 .649 .004 
TT x CC 
 
1,47 13.54 < 1 .740 .002 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 22.57 60.29 < .001 .562 
TT x PC x CC   1,47 13.83 1.81 .185 .037 
    Reward Aftereffect: RT 
Previous Trial Type (PTT) 
 
2,94 1678.06 17.65 < .001 .273 
PC 
 
1,47 1271.05 3.03 .088 .061 
CC 
 
1,47 2156.39 50.73 < .001 .519 
PTT x PC 
 
2,94 813.91 < 1 .776 .005 
PTT x CC 
 
2,94 830.18 < 1 .707 .007 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 1588.16 87.00 < .001 .649 
PTT x PC x CC   2,94 973.05 < 1 .624 .010 
  
Reward Aftereffect: PE 
PTT 
 
2,94 22.17 < 1 .855 .003 
PC 
 
1,47 24.48 < 1 .973 < .001 
CC 
 
1,47 29.25 8.85 .005 .158 
PTT x PC 
 
2,94 21.33 2.17 .120 .044 
PTT x CC 
 
2,94 15.98 < 1 .929 .002 
PC x CC 
 
1,47 54.87 62.81 < .001 .572 
PTT x PC x CC   2,94 21.33 < 1 .452 .017 
Note: Bold indicates statistically significant effects at alpha = .05 
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Figure 1. The event sequence on nonreward and reward trials. 
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Figure 2. Mean response times (RT) as a function of Previous Compatibility (after compatible vs. 
after incompatible) and Current Compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) in Experiment 1. 
A. The Role of Anticipation 
 
B. The Role of Reward Aftereffect 
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Figure 3. Mean response times (RT) as a function of Previous Compatibility (after compatible vs. 
after incompatible) and Current Compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) in Experiment 2. 
A. The Role of Anticipation 
 
B. The Role of Reward Aftereffect 
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Figure 4. Mean response times (RT) as a function of Previous Compatibility (after compatible vs. 
after incompatible) and Current Compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) in Experiment 3. 
A. The Role of Reward Anticipation 
 
B. The Role of Reward Aftereffect 
 
